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# Title: The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, And Chance (shelfmark Leibn. Marg. 163)
# Folio 217, page id 1030877386:0217
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217
on lest inhim, and a deliberation to bethink whichof these eme he
ean berter endure; And he that is ledro prisonbyforce, harh
election and may deliberate vhether he mill be baled and trainea
on the cronnd, or make use of his feet.
Likerrise rhenthere is no compulsion, but the streneth of temp–
ration ro do an evill action, beine creater thanthe motives to ab-
stain necessarily determine him co the doing of it, pet hc deliberates
rhil est sometimes the motives to do, somerimes the motivesto for-
bear are vorkine on him, and consequently heclecteth vhich he
vill. Bur commonly When me (ec and lnom the streneth that moves
us, me actnovledee Necessity. bnt hen me sec not, or marte not
the force that moves us, we rhenthinte there is none, and that it is
not Causes but Liberey that producech the action. Flence it is that
they thinte hedoes not choose this, that of necessiry et 0osethit; but
thez misht as mellsar. fire does not burn. because it burns of ne-
cessity. The second argument is not so much an areument, as a
distinction, tosem in vhat sense it may besaid, thac voluntary
actionsare necessitated, and in rhat sense not. Andtherefore he
alledeeth as from the authority of the Schools, ex that which rippect
uptheboctome ofche quection, thar there is a double act of tho
Will; Theone hesays, is actus Imperatus, an act done at the
commandofthe milt, by some inferiour faculty of the soul, as to
open or sutones eres, andtbis act may be compelled. The orher
hesays, is actus elicitus, an act allured, or an act drann forch bys
allurement ont ofche mill, as to will, to choose, to elect: This he
Cays cannot be compelled. Wrherein terring pass that Mecaphoricall
speech of artriburinqe command and subjection rothe faculties of
ihe Soul, as if they made a Common- mealchor F’amily amone
themselves, and conta speat one re ansther; Whichis very impro-
per in searchine the truthof the question; Tou may observe first.
that to compell a voluntary act, is nothine else, buc eo willits for it
is at one to jay, my vill commands the Buctine of mine eyes, or the
doine of any other action, and ro say. Thave th: will ro shut mine
eges. Sothat actus imperacus here, miehe as easily have been said
in Enslis, a volumary action, but that they thac invented ebe
rearm, understood not any thine it signified. Secondly, non may
observe, that actus elicieus, is exemplified by these mords, to W ill
to EbcCt, to Cihoose, which are al one, and so to will is here made