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# Title: The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, And Chance (shelfmark Leibn. Marg. 163)
# Folio 273, page id 1030877386:0273
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273
Spontaneous to be alone, Whercas before he had told us that eve-
ry Sponcancous Action is noc Voluncary, because indeliberate,
Nor erery Voluntary Action Spontaneous, if it proceed From
Fear.) Ie thintes he hath espied another contradiction. It is no
monder if speakine of Sponcaneous whichs signifieth nothine else in
Latin (for Fnelist it is not) but thac which is done de liberate ly ir
indeliberately rirhont compulsion. Tscem tothe Bistrop mho hath.
never sivon any definition of that mord, not touse it as he vronld
have me. Andtis casy for him to sive it any signification heplease
as the occasion sall serve, to charee me rmith contradiction. In
rrhat sense l’have used that mordonce, in the same lhave usedit
alvares, callins that Spontane ois which is wichont co action, or
compulsion by terrour.
(6) CNon terellsus, ehac chose actions which follon the last
appetite are Voluntarr, and rhere there is ons onely Appeti. C
chatsthe last. Bucbetore hecoldus, choc Voluntary presuppo-
Seth some precedent deliberation and mediration of what is likely to
follom, bothupenthe doins, and abstainine fromthe sction.
Tbis is a chird controdiction he supposeth he harhfound; but is
acain mistaten. For whenmenare to judse of actions, mhether
they be Voluntary or n. F. they cannot cal that action Voluncary.
mhich follorme d not the last appetite. But thesame men, though
there vere no deliberarion Bail judse there vas, becanse it ou eht
tohave been, and that (rom therime that the Lam mas lenomnto the
rime of the action it self. And therefore bothare true, that Volun-
tary may be virlont, and yet presupposed inthe Lam, not to be
vithont deliberation.
(a) FHe defines Liberey, XTumb. 29. tobe the abserce os
au exrri. sicat impediments to action. And vec in his Wtrole
discourse, he laboureth co make good, chac Whatsoerer is nOE
done, ischeretore noc done, because che AsenE WaS necesica
ced by extrinsecal causes, noc co doit. Are noc exrrinsecal
causes irhich decermine him nocro do ic, extrinsecal impedi-
mentsto Action?) This definirion of Liberty, that ic is che ab.
sence of all extrinsecal impedimenes eo action, he thinkes hebath
sufficiently confured by astine hether the extrinsecal causes
rrhich determine a mannor to do an action. be not extrinsccal im-
pediments to action. It seems by his question he makes no doubt
VH
but