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# Title: A Discourse In Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (shelfmarks ZEN Leibn. Marg. 40; Leibn. Marg. 40)
# Folio XXIX, page id 727097563:0035
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The PR F F ACF.
But can one whole entire indivisible Sub-
stance be actuallu divided into tbree Sub-
stances: For if every Person must have a
peculiar Substance of hisoin; and there be
three Persons, there must be three peculiar
Substances, and hon can there be three pe-
culiar Substances, and yet but one entire
and indivisible Substance: I do not Cay.
there must be three divided Substances in
place, or separate Substances, but theymust
be divided as three Individuals of the
same kind, which must introduce a Speci-
Fck Divine Nacure, which I thint very in-
consistent with the divine Perfections; but
of this at laree inthe followins Discourse.
 do not lay any force upon this areument,
that there can be no cround ot the Di. Fricheiim
charsed, P.
Rinction betireen the chree SubstanCeS, 16,
if chere be but one Substance in the c0d-
head, Cas some have done) because the
Pame Substance cannot boch unite and
distinonis them: for the cround of the
distinction is not the Suostance but the
Communication of il, and where that 15 P. 264.
so freely asserted, there is a reason distinct
fromthe Subctance it selt, Which makes the
Distinction of Persens.
But the difficuley. sil remains, how eact
Person pould have a Substance of his oon:
and vet there be but one entire and indivi-
sible
CXIX