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# Title: An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (shelfmarks Leibn. Marg. 38; ZEN Leibn. Marg. 38)
# Folio 182, page id 778263916:0198
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True an l’abse luclos
Thines ithout, cannor be thoughe false, beins exact Representarions or
Comethins: nor yet il thes have ans thing inthem, ditterins trom itie
realitr of Thinss, can they proxeriy be laid to be false Reprelentations.
Or Fdeas oF Thinss, ther do not represent. But the miltatie and fal.
hood is,
6. 2F. First, Whenthe Mind havins anx Idea, it judees and concludes
et the same, that is in other Mens Minds, sienified by the same name
or that it is contormable co the ordinary receired signification, or de-
tinition of that Word, irtien indecd it is not: Which is che most usu-
al mistakee in mixed Modes, though orher Ideas allo are liable to it.
5. 22. Seconalr, Wrhen it havino a complex idea made up ot luch a Col.
lection of Cimple ones, as Nature never puts cocether, it judces it io arée
20 a Species of Crearures really existine; as wrhren it joins the weistit ot
Tin, tothe colour, Fulibilies, and sxednels oF Crold.
8. 23. Thiraly, When in its complex Idea, it hras united a certain num-
ber ot limple Ideas, that do really exist rogether in lome lorts of Crea
tures, but has also lest out others, as much inseparable, it judces this to
be a perfect compleat Idea, of a sort of things which really it is not: v. e
having joined the sdeas ot substance, rellor, malleable, most heavr, and
fusible, it tatesthat complex Ldea to be thecompleat idea of Ciold, erten
Vet its Deculiar Axednels and solubilier in aqua Recia are as inseparable
trom chole ocher Ideas, or Oualities oFthat Body, as they are one from
another.
8. 24. Fourrhlr, Themistake is yex Greater, when I judce, that this com-
plex Ideas contains in it the real Fssence of any Body existing; When at
least it contains but lome ter of chole Proverties, Which Nor trom its
real Fssence and Constiturion. I lay, onty lome ser ofthole Proverties.
For those Properries consistine mostly in the active and passive Porers, ie
has, in reference to other Thinos, all that are vulgarts lenorn ot anyone
Body; and ofihich the complex idea ot that lind ot Things is usualy
made, are but a very ferr, in comparison of erhat a Man, that has leveral
rays tried and examined it, Rnors of that one sort of Things; and aII
that the most expere Man knons, are but ferr, in comparison ot vhat arc
reallr in that Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution.
Theessence ot a Triansle, lies in a verr little compals, consilts in a very
Ter Ideas; three Lines mecting at three Angles, makre ux that Fsence:
Bur ehe Properties that _o trom this Fsence, are more than can bc
ealily bnorri, or enumerated. 50 limasino it is in Subltances their real
Fissences lic, in a lictle compass; thoush the Properties Aoins trom chat
internal Constitution, are endless
8. 25. Foconclude, a Man havins no notion ol any Thins without
him, but by the Pdea he has of it in his Mind; Wrhich Idea, he has a
porer to call by What Name he pleases, he may, indeed, malce an Idea
neither ansverins the reality of Thinss, nor agrecins ro che Ideas com
inonty Cignitiedby ocher Peoples Words; but cannor makre a vrone, or
False idea oF a Thing, irhich isno otherrrise knovn to him, but by the
Ideahe has ofit. V. e. WhenI trame an Ldea otthe Legs, Arms, and Body
oF a Man, and join t0 this a FTorses FIcad and Neck, I do nor inatie a
False Lalea oF any thins; because it reprelents nochine rithout me. But
Wrhen Icall it a Man, or Partar, and imagine it cithier to represent some
real Beins rithour me, or tobe the lame Idea, that others callby the
Pairre name; in cither ot these cases, I may err. And uxon this account it
IS, Flat ic comes to be termed a false Idea; though, indeed, the Falhhood
lic not in che Idea bur in chat racit mencal Propolition, Wherein a con
formicy