An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, fol. 264
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The machine reads it as
- Degrees of Lnomlede
- C II A P.
- Ofthé Derrees of our Rnomledee.
- B. F. A LL our Knom ledse consistine, as Phave Paid, in the vieu the Minc
- a has oF its omn Ldeas, wrhich is theutmolt Lighe and greatest
- Certainty, re wich our Faculcies, and in our waz of Hnowledeseare capable
- ot it may not beamils, to consider a little the degrees of its Fvidence.
- The different clearness ol our Rnowledse leemsto me to lic in the ditte:
- rent ves oF Percoption, theMind has ot the Agreement, or Dilagree-
- ment oF any oF irs Ideas. Por il ve will refleet on our ovn nays of
- Thinlcins, We Mall tnd, that sometimes the Mind perceires the Aorce
- ment or Dilaereement of tiro Ideas immediarels by themselres, without
- thie intervention ot ans other: And this, Pchink, e may call intuitive
- Rnouledee. For in this, the Mind is at ro pains oF proving or examining.
- Dut perceires the Truth, asthe Frc doch Lishu, onts by being directed
- comard it. Thus the Mind Derccires, that irhite is nor Black, That 2
- Circle is not a Triansle, Thac Phrec are more than Tvo, and equal to
- One and Zvo. Such kind of Fruths, the Mind perceires at tho first Siohe
- OEthe Ideas tosether, by bare intuition, without the intervention of any
- other Idea; and this kind oF Rnomledse is the clearest, and most certair,
- that humane Prailey is capable oF. This part ot Rnomledge is irresicti
- ble, arid litce the bristr Sun. Minc, Forces it selF immediately to be per-
- ccired, as soon a5 ever the Mind curns is vieu chacvas; and leaves no
- room For Flelutation, Doubr, or texamination, buc the Mind is presentr
- tilled ich che clear Listut oFit. Tis on this incuition, that depends all
- theCerrainty and Fvidence oF all our Rnomledse, Wrhich Certainty every
- one Ands to De (0 great, that he cannor imagine, and theretore not require
- a greater: For a Man cannot conceire himsel(capable ot a greater Certair
- er, than to Hnor that an Idea in his Mind is luch, as he perceires it to
- be; and that tro ideas, uherein he perceires a difterence, are ditterent,
- and not precisely the lame. IIe that demands a greater Certainty than
- this, demands he bnons not what, and Mes only that he has a Mind 10
- Dea Sceptick, ithout being able to be lo. Certaintr depends so Wwholy
- on this Intuition, that in the next degree of Anowledee, Which I call De-
- monstrative, chis incuirion is necellars in all the Connexions ol the inter-
- mediate ideas, without whiehe canno aucan nnorledscandCerraints.
- 5. 2. The next degrec os Knomledse is, where the Mind perceires
- che Asreement or Disagreemene ol any Ldeas, buc noc immmediatels.
- Thoush Whereever the Mind perceires the Aoreement or Dilaoreement
- OFany oF its Ideas, there be certain Rnomledse: Vet it docs not alirays
- happen, that the Mind sees that Agreement or Dilaoreement, Which
- there is betreen them, even irhere it is discoverable; and in that cale,
- remains in Tonorance, or at most, gets no tarther than a probable conie-
- cture. The Realonwhy the Mind cannot alvass perceire prelenty the
- ACreemenE Or Dilagreement ot ero Ideas is, because thole Ideas, con-
- cernins Whole Aoreement or Dilagreement the lnquirs is made, cannot
- Dy the Mind Be so put together, as to Mer ic. In this Case theri, When
- the Mind cannot s0 brins ics ideas together, as by their immediate Com
- parison, and as it vere suxta polition, or application onc to another, t0
- Perceiretheir Agreement or Dilagreement, ic is fain, by the Intervention
- ot ocher Ideas (oncor more, a5 it happens) to dilcover the Aereement
- or Disasreement, Which it searches; and this is that which we call Reaso-
- ting.
Cite
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, fol. 264. Machine transcription, not an edition: Leibniz Legible (model FoNDUE-GD_v2_ft_Leibniz, run 74). https://leibnizlegible.com/page/778263916:0280?run=74